Patchwork states : the localization of state territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda border, 1914-2014. by Leonardi,  Cherry
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
06 August 2020
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Leonardi, Cherry (2020) 'Patchwork states : the localization of state territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda
border, 1914-2014.', Past present., 248 (1). pp. 209-258.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtz052
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© The Past and Present Society, Oxford, 2020. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
PATCHWORK STATES: THE
LOCALIZATION OF STATE
TERRITORIALITY ON THE SOUTH
SUDAN–UGANDA BORDER, 1914–2014*
In 2014, Ugandan local government officials took national census
enumerators to villages they claimed were inside Uganda’s Moyo
District, in the north-west of the country. There they were
arrested by South Sudanese authorities, who insisted that this
territory belonged to South Sudan’s Kajokeji County. They
were soon released, but the incident sparked off days of cross-
border violence along ethnic lines: the international border here
remains defined by a 1914 British colonial order, which sought to
make it a ‘tribal’ boundary between the Kuku of Kajokeji and the
Ma’di of Moyo.1 Yet this conflict a century later was in many ways
* This research was funded primarily by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung Special
Programme Security Society and the State (2014–16), and a Durham University
Impact Seedcorn Fund and Economic and Social Research Council Impact
Acceleration Award (2015–16), supplemented by further research in Uganda in
2017 conducted under a UK Arts and Humanities Research Council grant (AH/
N007956/1) led by Jonathan Fisher; I am very grateful to him and to my co-
researcher on the former project, Martina Santschi. The research was assisted and
informed by many people, in particular Ade Browne, Julian Hopwood, Pamela
Khanakwa, Nicki Kindersley, Douglas Johnson, Jok Madut Jok, Peter Hakim Justin,
Leben Moro, Naomi Pendle, Mareike Schomerus, Liz Storer, Lotje de Vries and my
research assistants in South Sudan and Uganda: Alimure Mo¨di Waran Jansuk, Ronald
Iya and Caesar Andevu. I am grateful for research approval from the Uganda National
Council of Science and Technology and Office of the President and from the South
Sudan Ministry of Culture, and for support in Uganda from the Makerere University
Institute for Social Research, the Centre for Basic Research and the AIDS Support
Organisation, and in South Sudan from the University of Juba. I thank all the relevant
local government and security officials for allowing me to undertake interview and
documentary research in their areas, and the staff of the archives consulted; particular
thanks to Tim Allen for generously sharing his personal archives from Uganda, to
Jillian Luff ofMAPgrafix for the map and to the Rift Valley Institute for allowing its use
and amendment. Seminars at the Centre for African Studies, Edinburgh University
and with John Clay in Durham’s history department were very helpful opportunities to
discuss earlier versions of this paper. Finally, I am immensely grateful to colleagues
who have patiently and constructively read and commented on drafts: Richard
Huzzey, James Koranyi, Christian Liddy, Graeme Small, Chris Vaughan, Justin
Willis and Andy Wood. Remaining flaws are of course my own.
1 The author was in Kajokeji and Moyo during and after the conflict; interviews
from this period of fieldwork as well as interviews in South Sudan in 2013 and 2015
and Uganda in 2017 are cited in this article. See also UN Mission in South Sudan,
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surprising and unprecedented.2 Despite recurrent armed
rebellions spilling across the border, the Kuku and Ma’di
themselves had a long history of peaceful relations,
intermarriage, trade and common farming livelihoods in the
green hills above the west bank of the Nile. Never formally
demarcated, this international border has been described as the
epitome of an ‘artificial’ colonial boundary, resisted or ignored by
local communities with enduring cross-border solidarities.3 ‘We
are the same people, same blood’, representatives of the closely
allied national governments had declared in 2011, seeking to
defuse the rising local tensions over the border.4 So why had
this boundary become such a focus of tension and conflict on
the ground, and why was it the local — rather than central —
government administrations on either side that were leading the
competing assertions of state territorial limits?
Answering these questions entails addressing more
fundamental questions about the nature and history of state
territory in these countries, with implications for how we
(n. 1 cont.)
‘South Sudanese Displaced by Kajo-Keji Conflict Receive Aid Items’, 25 Sept. 2014,
5https://unmiss.unmissions.org/south-sudanese-displaced-kajo-keji-conflict-receive
-aid-items4; Robert Obetia, ‘Thousands Stranded after Conflict on South Sudan–
Uganda Border’, Niles, 25 Sept. 2014,5http://www.theniles.org/en/articles/archive/
2461/4; Radio Tamazuj, ‘Uganda-S Sudan Agree to ‘‘Stop Fighting’’ between Kuku
and Ma’di’, 21 Sept. 2014, 5https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/uganda-s-
sudan-agree-to-stop-fighting-between-kuku-and-ma-di4(all accessed 5 Nov. 2018).
2 For example, Alfred Geri, ‘Implications of Moyo–Kajo-Keji Conflict’, Gurtong,
27 Oct. 2014, 5http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/
mid/519/articleId/15771/Implications-of-Moyo-Kajo-Keji-Conflict.aspx4(accessed
5 Nov. 2018).
3 Ade. Adefuye, ‘The Kakwa of Uganda and the Sudan: The Ethnic Factor in
National and International Politics’, in A. I. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans:
Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries, 1884–1984 (Lagos, 1985);
Jozef Merkx, ‘Refugee Identities and Relief in an African Borderland: A Study of
Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, xxi (Geneva,
2002); Mark Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line: 100 Years of the North-West Uganda/
South Sudan Border’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, iii (2009). For other
examples of boundaries uniting rather than (or as well as) dividing ‘borderlanders’,
see Donna K. Flynn, ‘ ‘‘We are the Border’’: Identity, Exchange, and the State along
the Be´nin–Nigeria Border’, American Ethnologist, xxiv (1997); Alexander Horstmann
and Reed L. Wadley (eds.), Centering the Margin in Southeast Asia (New York, 2006);
Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (eds.), Border Identities: Nation and State at
International Frontiers (Cambridge, 1998).
4 ‘Resolutions of a Joint Meeting between the Republic of South Sudan and
Uganda, 21–23 July 2011, Kajokeji County’, Moyo District Records Office, Moyo
District Council File no. CR 1203/1: Disputes.
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approach state formation as a spatial process more broadly. This
article draws on oral histories from Moyo and Kajokeji and largely
district-level documentation to reorient our understanding of
border-making and state-formation processes from the centre to
the local. This approach reveals the historical and contemporary
role of local-level actors in constituting state territorial sovereignty
by investing in their own jurisdictional and political patches. The
result has been the ongoing emergence of these states as
patchworks of local government territories, making the
international border simultaneously a boundary of the local state.
This argument runs counter to the tendency of scholarly and
media analysis to see the intensification of local territoriality —
whether understood as the resilience of primordial ethnic
divisions5 or as newer populist political reactions to globalization6
— as a sign of the fragmentation and failure of states in Africa and
beyond.7 Such approaches often imply that state control of territory
depends on the capacity and will of the centre to project or
‘broadcast’ its power across the periphery.8 Yet the work of
borderlands scholars has increasingly demonstrated that states
can also be constructed from the outside in, as borderland
inhabitants play a crucial role in giving meaning and value to
national boundaries on the ground.9 To some extent, however,
5 For example, Ole Frahm, ‘Making Borders and Identities in South Sudan’,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, xxxiii (2015); Max Fisher, ‘The Dividing of
a Continent: Africa’s Separatist Problem’, Atlantic, 10 Sept. 2012.
6 For example, Charles S. Maier, Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth,
and Belonging since 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016), esp. 290–1.
7 See, in particular, Achille Mbembe, ‘At the Edge of the World: Boundaries,
Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa’, trans. Steven Rendall, Public Culture, xii
(2000), esp. 284.
8 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and
Control (Princeton, 2000); Frahm, ‘Making Borders and Identities in South Sudan’;
Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World
(Cambridge, 1996), 87. More broadly, see Christopher Clapham, ‘Sovereignty and
the Third World State’, Political Studies, xlvii (1999), 525; Ronan Paddison, The
Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power (Oxford, 1983), esp. 12.
9 Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier
(Oxford, 2002); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the
Pyrenees (Berkeley, 1989); Rafe Blaufarb, ‘The Survival of the Pays d’E´tats: The
Example of Provence’, Past and Present, no. 209 (Nov. 2010); Dereje Feyissa and
Markus V. Hoehne (eds.), Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa
(Woodbridge, 2010); Christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus and Lotje de Vries
(eds.), The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and
Historical Perspective (New York, 2013); Horstmann and Wadley, Centering the
Margin in Southeast Asia.
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such approaches continue to replicate centre–periphery spatial
models, even if they seek to reverse these by placing borderlands
at the centre of the analysis. Rather than emphasizing the distinctive
features of international boundaries, this article suggests that the
Moyo–Kajokeji border dynamics reflect broader internal processes
ofboundary-making across Uganda and South Sudan.10 And while
these borderlands undoubtedly represent some of the most
marginalized and alienated peripheries of either state, this centre–
periphery geography has been cross-cut by the horizontal tensions
between neighbouring territories and partially counteracted by the
resulting local appeals to higher state authority.
This article thus explores the territorial implications of
approaches to state formation that have sought to replace
centre–periphery models with an emphasis on the centrality of
the local state. The term ‘patchwork’ is intended not only to
describe patterns of state territoriality but also as a spatial
metaphor for the way in which state authority has been co-
produced through local engagement and appropriation. As
scholars have increasingly argued in relation to other periods
and places, this ‘localization of state power’ has been central to
state formation rather than a sign of state weakness or
fragmentation.11
It is not unusual, of course, to describe states and nations as
patchworks of regions, localities, ethnicities or federated units.
10 On the neglected significance of internal state territoriality, see Peter Vandergeest
and Nancy Lee Peluso, ‘Territorialization and State Power in Thailand’, Theory and
Society, xxiv (1995).
11 Steve Hindle, The State and Social Change in EarlyModern England, c.1550–1640
(Basingstoke, 2000), 23. See also, for example, Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries:
The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’,
American Ethnologist, xxii (1995); Philip Whalen and Patrick Young (eds.), Place and
Locality in Modern France (London, 2014); Madeleine Reeves, Johan Rasanayagam
and Judith Beyer (eds.),Ethnographies of the State inCentral Asia (Bloomington, 2014);
Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds.), States of Imagination: Ethnographic
Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham, NC, 2001); Christian Lund, Local
Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa (Cambridge, 2008); Catherine Boone,
Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice
(Cambridge, 2003); Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the
Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003 (Oxford, 2006); Naseem Badiey, The State
of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Land, Urban Development and State-Building in Juba,
Southern Sudan (Woodbridge, 2014); Chris Vaughan, Darfur: Colonial Violence,
Sultanic Legacies and Local Politics, 1916–1956 (Woodbridge, 2015); Tobias
Hagmann and Didier Pe´clard, ‘Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and
Domination in Africa’, Development and Change, xli (2010).
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But often the implication is that states have been superimposed
onto prior, smaller territorial identities or polities.12 Instead this
article uses the term ‘patchwork’ more precisely to characterize
the mutual constitution of local and national state territories. The
metaphor is particularly apt because a patchwork involves the
fabrication of both the individual patches and the overall quilt.
The ‘patches’ in Sudan and Uganda did not lie intact waiting for
state power to stitch them together, but have been imagined,
drawn, cut and sewn — and recut and resewn — by multiple
actors engaged and invested in state territoriality at the local
level.13 In turn, the state is not a mere ‘de´cor’ or ‘fac¸ade’, as has
been argued in relation to the postcolonial African state more
widely,14 but is fundamentally made of these constituent
patches. A patchwork can be reworked, unstitched and re-
stitched, thus emphasizing territory as a ‘work’ always in
progress. It can be rough and messy, allowing for the fraying of
seams and entanglements of prior geographies in the production
of state territory. As political geographers emphasize,
‘entanglement’ is a similarly useful spatial metaphor for
describing the ‘threadings, knottings and weavings’ of power
relations as these are ‘spun out across and through the material
spaces of the world’.15 The material environment has also given
patterns to the political construction of space:16 natural features
are seen as a source of historical evidence in continuing debates
12 For example, Alon Confino, ‘The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Heimat, National
Memory and the German Empire, 1871–1918’, History and Memory, v (1993), esp.
48; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837, 2nd edn (New Haven,
2005), 17. For similar implications in recent Russian state discourse, see Emil
Persson, ‘Tears in the Patchwork: The Sochi Olympics and the Display of a
Multiethnic Nation’, Euxeinos, xii (2013).
13 See also Paul Nadasdy, ‘Boundaries among Kin: Sovereignty, the Modern Treaty
Process, and the Rise of Ethno-Territorial Nationalism among Yukon First Nations’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, liv (2012), 503.
14 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political
Instrument (Oxford, 1999), 15–16.
15 Joanne P. Sharp et al. (eds.), Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/
Resistance (Abingdon, 2000), ch. 1, p. 24 (editors’ intro.). The term is used similarly by
Mark Pittaway, ‘National Socialism and the Production of German–Hungarian
Borderland Space on the Eve of the Second World War’, Past and Present, no. 216
(Aug. 2012), 152.
16 See Stuart Elden, ‘Legal Terrain: The Political Materiality of Territory’, London
Review of International Law, v (2017); Joost Fontein, Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape,
Water and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe (Woodbridge, 2015); and for a broader
perspective on human–material entanglements, see Ian Hodder, Studies in Human–
Thing Entanglement (2016).
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over the South Sudan–Uganda border, for example, and played
an active role in determining working boundary lines made on the
ground by local officials.17
A patchwork state is not, then, simply a conglomeration of
smaller entities or identities (as any state might appear), but a
dynamic work-in-process in specific contexts where local
territories emerge through and as a fundamental part of state
formation. Such processes are particularly apparent in many
African contexts, where twentieth-century colonialism
entailed an unprecedented attempt to contain, govern and
define people within bounded territories.18 The shift from
personal, plural and overlapping jurisdictions to territorial
sovereignty occurred as a much longer-term process in
Western Europe, for example.19 But European governments
took an increasing interest in defining and defending their
boundaries and, from the late eighteenth century, in unifying
and controlling the fabric of national space.20 In contexts like
Sudan and Uganda, by contrast, governance strategies have
instead worked to accentuate and multiply the internal seams.
While territory may be an outcome of state formation
everywhere, its particular patchwork patterns in these
contexts reflect political and economic dynamics that have
rendered territorial control and identification more important
for political power and resource access at the local level than at
the national level. These dynamics will be explored through the
rest of the article and include recurrent decentralization
programmes, changing land values and the territorialization
and politicization of ethnicity as the basis for citizenship.
The sporadic and limited interest of central governments in
defining or demarcating the boundary between Uganda and
Sudan (now South Sudan) is apparent in the archival record
17 Interview with clan land custodian and former local government officer, Kajokeji,
South Sudan, 16 Sept. 2014.
18 Christopher J. Gray, Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa: Southern Gabon
ca. 1850–1940 (Rochester, NY, 2002), 19; Carola Lentz, ‘Decentralization, the State
and Conflicts over Local Boundaries in Northern Ghana’, Development and Change,
xxxvii (2006); Gillian Mathys, People on the Move: Frontiers, Borders, Mobility and
History in the Lake Kivu Region 19
th
–20
th
Century (Ghent Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 2014).
19 Sahlins, Boundaries.
20 Maier,OnceWithin Borders; Charles Tilly,Coercion, Capital, and European States,
AD 990–1992 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
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and previous studies of the border.21 The new perspective
presented in this article on local-level investment in state
boundaries derives from new documentary and oral sources as
well as from the analytical approach to state formation outlined
above. Interviews and local-level documentation produced in
Moyo and Kajokeji immediately before and after the 2014
conflict narrated the history of the international border through
a series of key markers in both space and time, in order to evidence
contemporary territorial claims. The conflict context no doubt
produced newly virulent rival assertions of the border — both oral
histories and the archival record simultaneously emphasized the
historical prevalence of more peaceful cross-border relations. But
the very production of rival historical narratives is an aspect of the
local investment in the international boundary with which this
article is concerned. As Newman and Paasi argue, it is through
such narratives that boundaries are constructed;22 telling the
story of the border through key moments in time was working
to fix its location in people’s spatial imaginaries, demonstrating
the temporal and processual nature of territory. The article
therefore takes these narratives seriously and in their own
terms, not to suggest that the boundary has always been as
significant or contentious as in recent years, nor to try to verify
one or other side of the story, but because they reveal what local
actors have identified as the key moments and factors in a long-
term process by which the international boundary came to be a
focus of conflict — something that they too often described as a
historical puzzle. These key moments also appear in the archival
records, along with the repeated initiatives by local government
officials, chiefs, councillors and politicians to try to define and
demarcate the international boundary in the face of central
government disinterest. Strikingly, both oral and documentary
sources also revealed similar struggles over internal boundaries,
as the unfulfilled colonial vision of bounded ‘tribal’ territories has
21 Douglas H. Johnson, When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary-
Making in Southern Sudan’s Frontier Zones (London, 2010), 101–4; Faisal Abdel
Rahman Ali Taha, ‘The Sudan–Uganda Boundary’, Sudan Notes and Records, lix
(1978); Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia
(London, 1979), 1002–10; Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’.
22 David Newman and Anssi Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern
World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography,
xxii (1998).
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increasingly become the basis for the administrative and political
geography of both Uganda and South Sudan.
The border between the Nile and Kaya rivers (now Kajokeji’s
border with Moyo and Yumbe Districts of Uganda) exemplifies
the colonial attempt to base state boundaries on tribal territories
(see Map). A 1914 Order of the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies remains the only legal definition of the boundary,
despite geographical inaccuracies and its problematic use of
‘the southern limits of the Kuku tribe’ to define part of this
stretch.23 Even a later British colonial official in Uganda
pronounced this ‘the world’s most idiotic’ boundary
description, asking ‘If the Kuku tribe decide to move, do they
carry the international boundary with them?’24 Yet this is a
question which has continued to be asked of internal
administrative jurisdictions in these states — are they exercised
over (mobile) subjects or over bounded territories? The
continuing disputes over this question demonstrate that the
constitution of territory is an ongoing and incomplete process.25
By defining part of the Sudan–Uganda boundary in such tribal
terms and more generally assuming ethnic identities to be
territorial, the British colonial administrations established a basis
for changing and emerging local definitions of ethnic territory to
work their way into rival assertions of the boundary line. Section I
of this article therefore begins by exploring recent, predominantly
oral, local accounts of territorial history in this borderland to
emphasize the impossibility of entirely disentangling ‘indigenous’
from ‘government’ territorialities or uncovering a distinct pre-
colonial basis for the current patchwork. Section II argues that
the colonial ambition to map and fix people within boundaries
was repeatedly undone by the limits of central government
capacity or will, and by the resistance of borderland inhabitants,
but that the patchwork state territories nevertheless began to take
shape through the initiative of local government actors between the
1920s and 1940s. Section III contends that, despite an increased
23 On geographical inaccuracies regarding streams, see Imperial Boundary Making:
TheDiary of CaptainKelly and the Sudan–UgandaBoundary Commission of 1913, ed. G.
H. Blake (London, 1997), p. xxv (editor’s intro.).
24 Walter R. Bazley, ‘Reminiscences as District Officer in Uganda’ (n.d.), Bodleian
Libraries Commonwealth and African Collections, Oxford (hereafter Bodleian
Library), MSS.Afr.s.924.
25 See also Stuart Elden,The Birth of Territory (Chicago, 2013); Maier,OnceWithin
Borders.
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central government investment in asserting territorial sovereignty
around and after Sudanese and Ugandan independence, it was
largely at the local state level that the international boundary was
a focus of concern and action in the period from the 1950s to
1980s. The final section of the article focuses on the parallel
policies of decentralization espoused both in Uganda by the
MAP
SUDAN–UGANDA BOUNDARY PROPOSALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN NILE
AND KAYA RIVERS (ALL LINES APPROXIMATE)
Line 1 based on Sudan Survey Department 1:250,000 maps 86-A and 86-B, showing
undemarcated international boundary, including ‘Approximate Boundary described
as ‘‘following the southern boundary of the Kuku tribe’’ ’, Sudan Archive, Durham.
Lines 2–4 based on ‘Sketch illustrating the alignment of the boundary reached by
compromise in 1936’, enclosed in M. Lloyd, Directorate of Colonial Surveys,
Surbiton, to I. S. Wheatley, Colonial Office, 9 April 1956, TNA, CO 822/954. Lines 4
and 5 shown on ‘Sketch map to illustrate the ad hoc administrative agreement’,
enclosed in Acting Governor of Uganda to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 20 Dec. 1960, TNA, CO 822/2818.
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ruling National Resistance Movement since 1986, and in
South(ern) Sudan by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) during its war against the Sudan government
(1983–2005) and its establishment of new state structures in
advance of South Sudan’s independence in 2011. This period
has seen an intensification of local government territoriality,
encouraged also by the channelling of international development
resources to the local level and by the commercialization of land
and natural resources. As boundary disputes have proliferated, the
entanglement of multiple territorial layers and logics has become
more evident than ever in the ongoing production of these states as
patchworks.
I
A PRE-COLONIAL PATCHWORK?
Africanist historians often contrast pre-colonial/indigenous and
colonial forms of territoriality, and associate the latter with the
imposition of linear boundaries and more ethnically defined and
exclusionary ideas of territory.26 Yet interviewees in Kajokeji and
Moyo were swift to assert that ‘boundaries are known’ and to
emphasize the deep historicity of the territorial arrangements
that upheld their competing definitions of the international
boundary. Their accounts, however, drew on multiple threads
of legitimation for their territorial claims, from oral traditions of
ancestral migration to the markers of colonial and post-colonial
boundaries. There were some national differences in these
accounts: Ugandans often evoked legalism and technical
expertise, asserting that the boundary had already been defined
with GPS coordinates in Uganda’s 1967 constitution and simply
needed to be demarcated, while pointing to various ‘illegal’
incursions by South Sudanese since the 1990s.27 South
26 For example, David Gordon, ‘Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial
Chiefs in the Borderlands of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo’, International
Journal of African Historical Studies, xxxiv (2001), 318; Bill Bravman, Making Ethnic
Ways: Communities and their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800–1950 (Portsmouth,
1998), 108–16; Gu¨nther Schlee and Abdullahi A. Shongolo, Pastoralism and Politics in
Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia (Woodbridge, 2012), 26–32; Carola Lentz,
Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh, 2006).
27 Interview with male district councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 24 May 2017; Petition of
the people of Moyo District to the Parliament of Uganda, presented by Hon. Alero Aza
Tom, MP, West Moyo County (n.d., c.2012), copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-
County Office, Moyo District, Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014.
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Sudanese in Kajokeji reached much further back in history to
support their claims that ‘the southern boundary of the Kuku
tribe’ reached well south of the Ugandan constitutional
definition, even claiming that there had once been a boundary
signpost on Lake Albert, or in Moyo town.28 At the same time
they asserted ancestral Kuku land rights in the borderlands,
based on the histories of individual ‘clans’. These different
claims show that the threads of contemporary territoriality
cannot simply be disentangled to reveal an underlying pre-
colonial patchwork, though the idea that such a patchwork exists
has long been asserted as the basis for boundary definitions by a
range of state actors.
The South Sudanese references to historic boundary markers
located deep in what is now Ugandan territory — though
dismissed as ludicrous by Ugandans — are rooted in the
messy history of imperialism and boundary adjustments in the
region.29 This was a frontier zone even in the mid to late
nineteenth century, at the violent edges of ivory and slave trading
emanating both northwards from the east African coast via the
lacustrine kingdoms, and southwards from Sudan and Egypt,
closely followed by the expanding frontier of Turco-Egyptian
imperialism. The latter reached into what is now northern
Uganda until the overthrow of Turco-Egyptian rule by Mahdist
forces in the 1880s. Initially a focus of intense interest forEuropean
explorers, by the 1890s the upper Nile had become the object of
competing European imperialisms. The Belgians were first to
establish a presence on the ground and a claim to territory that
would eventually be restricted by the 1906 Anglo-Congolese
Agreement to a lifetime lease of the ‘Lado Enclave’ to King
Leopold. Upon his death in 1909, the Enclave was incorporated
into the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan, which had
been established by the British-led ‘reconquest’ in 1899. For a
brief period between 1911 and 1914, the West Nile region of
Uganda, including what is now Moyo District, was indeed
28 Interviews with two clan land custodians, Wudu, Kajokeji County, South Sudan,
19 Sept. 2014; with male teacher/historian/political officer, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 28 Sept. 2014; and with young male spokesperson for a Kuku ethnic
association, Juba, 22 July 2015.
29 See Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’; Robert O. Collins, King Leopold, England and
the Upper Nile, 1899–1909 (New Haven, Conn., 1968); Robert O. Collins, ‘Sudan–
Uganda Boundary Rectification and the Sudanese Occupation of Madial, 1914’,
Uganda Journal, xxvi (1962).
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administered from Kajokeji in Sudan. But the British
administrations of Sudan and Uganda soon decided to adjust
their boundary to include the West Nile region in Uganda in
return for Sudan acquiring territory east of the Nile. This
history of dramatically shifting boundaries explains some of
the more extreme South Sudanese claims to Ugandan territory
now, and is also expressed in local stories of boundary marker
stones being carried back and forth by various individuals
from each side until they were eventually left somewhere in
the middle.30
That boundaries move with people is also implicit in the
territorial logic embedded in clan histories and ideas of spiritual
authority over land. Oral traditions focus not on tribal origins of
‘the Kuku’ or ‘the Ma’di’ but on the origins and relations of the
numerous clans that are now said to make up these ethnic groups.
Each exogamous clan is said to be descended patrilineally from a
particular heroic ancestor who migrated from elsewhere to settle
as the ‘firstcomer’ in the place now defined as clan territory
(usually several square miles in extent). One of his direct
descendants inherits ritual responsibility for this clan land as its
‘custodian’ or ‘landlord’. Oral traditions also tell of other people
who came later and were invited to settle around the firstcomers
to act like a protective ‘fence’; again there is the idea that people
can constitute a boundary.31 ‘It is like a zariba [fenced/fortified
enclosure]: those in the north, south, east and west defend us and
we landlords are here in the middle. And [we] intermarry with
these tribes until they become one now’.32 In common with many
other African oral traditions, these accounts reveal the inclusive
and flexible nature of clan kinship and territoriality, in which clans
sought to build strength in numbers, or ‘wealth-in-people’,
by absorbing newcomers through marriage, alliance or
subordination.33
30 Interviews with local politician from Kajokeji in Juba, South Sudan, 5 Aug. 2013,
and with young male spokesperson for a Kuku ethnic association, Juba, South Sudan,
22 July 2015.
31 Interviews with male clan land custodian, Saregoro, Kajokeji County, South
Sudan, 15 Sept. 2014, and with local politician/businessman, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 23 Sept. 2014.
32 Interview with male clan land custodian and former local government officer,
Wudu, Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 16 Sept. 2014.
33 Igor Kopytoff (ed.), The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African
Societies (Bloomington, 1987); Jane I. Guyer, ‘Wealth in People, Wealth in Things:
220 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 248
(cont. on p. 221)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/248/1/209/5870984 by U
niversity of D
urham
 user on 06 August 2020
Nowadays clan territories are often asserted to be clearly
bounded: ‘Every person knows the boundaries, because we
are divided into clans and the clan boundaries are known’.34
Yet at the same time boundary-drawing is considered a morally
and spiritually dangerous exercise, connoting an antisocial
divisiveness. Like falsely claiming land or disputing boundaries,
it is seen to provoke the dangerous spiritual forces associated with
the soil and streams. Land custodians are said to point out
boundaries to people, but ‘they don’t put marks like a signpost;
they use natural things, like trees, streams, hills. If any of us uses a
hoe and starts making a boundary, that is already a curse’ — ‘that
is a sign of division and it will bring curses, death’.35 In effect, this
means that boundaries are constituted in the knowledge and
memory of clan land custodians and other respected elders
(preserving a central role for them in boundary disputes) more
than they are visible on the ground — a technique of territoriality
not entirely different from the existence of boundaries as lines on
maps, interpretable on the ground only by those with the
necessary technical expertise and equipment.36
Clan traditions thus suggest the existence of territory before or
beneath the creation of states, in the sense that the firstcomer/
custodian families claim to have long exercised exclusive — albeit
largely ritualized and latent — authority over land and its resources
withinbounded clan territories, which form an intricate small-scale
patchwork across the region. But this depiction is complicated by
the limits of clan-based authority and existence of multiple
wider forms of political power, such as rainmakers or local allies
of the nineteenth-century commercial and military forces.37 Oral
(n. 33 cont.)
Introduction’, Journal of AfricanHistory, xxxvi (1995); Gray,Colonial Rule andCrisis in
Equatorial Africa; Carola Lentz, Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa
(Bloomington, 2013).
34 Interview with young male journalist from Kajokeji in Juba, South Sudan, 8 Sept.
2014.
35 Interviews with two male state government officials from Kajokeji in Juba, South
Sudan, 14 Sept. 2010; with a male church pastor, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 20 Sept. 2014; and with a clan land custodian, Leikor, Kajokeji
County, South Sudan, 21 Sept. 2014. See also Zoe Cormack, ‘Boundaries are
Galaxies: Interpreting Contestations over Local Administrative Boundaries in
South Sudan’, Africa, lxxxvi (2016).
36 See also Elden, The Birth of Territory, 15.
37 Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship,
Community and State (Woodbridge, 2013).
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traditions are also influenced by changing understandings of clan
territoriality in the twenty-first century as the increasing
monetization of land transactions has given new value to the
ritual and historical expertise claimed by land custodians. As we
shall see, increasing disputes over administrative boundaries have
further entangledandpoliticizedclanboundaries in theassertion of
larger ethnic territories. Yet the strikingly consistent thing about the
clan traditions is that they tell of multiple origins: all the founding
fathers of clans in both Kajokeji and Moyo are said to have come
from other places and from different ethnic origins; the same clans
are also found now within different ethnic groups.38 The process of
becoming Kuku or Ma’di appears to have emerged through co-
residence in a particular area and the gradual ascendancy of one
or other language and identity.
This is a process that was certainly encouraged, if not coerced,
by colonial administrations. European colonialists arrived in the
region on the expansionist tide of confidence in their technological
capacity to control vast territory and with a zeal for imposing ‘a
geometry of lines and areas’, as they already had across much of
Europe and beyond.39 Yet boundaries were not simply decided by
arbitrary haggling and line-drawing in European boardrooms.40
For the broader cartographic obsession of the nineteenth century
also sought the control and categorization of space within
territories, exemplified in the Great Trigonometrical Survey of
India — though the illusory power of maps frequently belied the
limits of imperial knowledge and the complex realities on the
ground.41 In much of Africa the illusion of colonial order rested
on ‘tribal’ categorizations. From the earliest stages of boundary
negotiation in what would become the Sudan–Uganda
38 Interview with local politician/businessman, Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 23
Sept. 2014. See also Leopold ‘Crossing the Line’, 137–8; Emory Bundy, ‘Madi’, in
Joel D. Barkan et al., Uganda District Government and Politics, 1947–1967 (Madison,
1977), 273; Tim Allen, ‘Social Upheaval and the Struggle for Community: A Study of
the Ugandan Madi’ (Univ. of Manchester Ph.D. thesis, 1993).
39 Maier, Once Within Borders, 215.
40 See also Simon Katzellenbogen, ‘It Didn’t Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics
and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa’s Colonial Boundaries’, in Paul Nugent and A. I.
Asiwaju (eds.), African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities (London,
1996).
41 Maier, Once Within Borders, 230; Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The
Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843 (Chicago, 1997); Steven Seegel,
Mapping Europe’s Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire (Chicago,
2012).
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borderlands, the same logics of ‘tribal mapping’ were thus at work
in both internal and inter-colonial territorial ordering. During the
protracted Anglo-Belgian negotiations over the Lado Enclave,
King Leopold’s negotiator produced ‘an elaborate tribal map of
the southern Sudan’, derided by British negotiators as ‘a fantastic
combination of the King’s imagination and Junker’s explorations
made some twenty years before’.42
The British were soon engaged in their own attempts at such
mapping, and decided in 1911 that the new boundary between
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Uganda Protectorate ‘should
be a tribal one’.43 To the west of the Nile, the subsequent
Boundary Commission was instructed to identify a line that
would separate Bari language-speakers, that is Kuku and
Kakwa, from the Ma’di and Lugbara, despite a Ugandan report
of close relations between Kuku and Ma’di.44 The first British
administrator in Kajokeji, Captain Chauncey Stigand, was
particularly fond of stereotyping entire tribes, and had already
decided in 1911 that the Kuku around his headquarters were of
a ‘peaceful disposition’ while the Ma’di were ‘a treacherous and
cowardly people’. He also reported that the Kayu/Ayo stream was
‘the boundary between the Madi and Kuku country’, a definition
that would be included in the Commission’s decision.45 Yet in a
more detailed account published posthumously, Stigand noted
the very recent migrations in the area (reporting that some Kuku
had previously lived south of the Kayu stream), and the ethnic
‘mixture’ in many areas.46
Captain Kelly, Chief Commissioner of the Sudan–Uganda
Boundary Commission, casually acknowledged that creating a
tribal boundary might necessitate ‘the transplanting of a few
villages’ and that ‘it should remain with the officials conversant
with actual local conditions to arrange the exact line which will
most conveniently separate the mixed population’. Despite this
presumptive confidence in the colonial capacity for territorial
42 Collins, King Leopold, 122, cited in Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’, 466.
43 Viscount Kitchener to Edward Grey, Cairo, 27 Oct. 1911, The National
Archives, London (hereafter TNA), WO 181/236.
44 Collins, ‘Sudan–Uganda Boundary’, 144; Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’, 469; F.
J. Jackson, Governor of Uganda, to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 14 Mar. 1912, TNA, WO 181/236.
45 Sudan Intelligence Report 198, Jan. 1911, TNA, WO 106/6224; Leopold,
‘Crossing the Line’ 469. This stream is called Kayo by the Kuku and Ayo by the Ma’di.
46 C. H. Stigand, Equatoria: The Lado Enclave (London, 1923), 69–92.
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reorganization, he admitted that ‘the boundary recommended is
not based on first-hand knowledge’.47 The Sudan Director of
Surveys suggested ‘that a definite settlement should stand over
until a reliable map has been prepared’, and the Sudan
government therefore only agreed to the publication of the
Uganda Order on 21 April 1914 ‘as a provisional measure’.48
The governments of Sudan and Uganda did not make any
immediate effort to clarify the boundary, however. Instead, as
the Commission had advised, it was left to provincial and
district administrators on the ground to try to make sense of it.
From the outset, these local officials were as or more preoccupied
with mapping and organizing internal territory. The first British
administrator of the new West Nile District of Uganda (including
Moyo), A. E. Weatherhead, met Stigand soon after his arrival and
was clearly influenced by the latter’s categorization of tribes in the
area and his goal of amalgamating small communities under
chiefs in order ultimately to build ‘tribal’ administration.49
Weatherhead complained about the ethnic mixing in the
district, including Kuku among Ma’di — a situation he set out
to remedy by trying to establish clear boundaries between ‘tribes’,
if necessary by moving settlements.50 Once again, however,
colonial confidence outweighed actual knowledge: a later
British officer serving in the same district described a map
drawn by Weatherhead in 1920 as ‘not merely inaccurate, but
completely wrong. Whole tribes are shown in the wrong places,
rivers flow in the reverse directions, and distances are mistaken by
hundreds per cent’.51
The creation of the Sudan–Uganda boundary was flawed from
the outset by the gap between European cartographic confidence
and actual geographic knowledge, and more fundamentally by
the assumption that a ‘tribal’ chequerboard should be the basis
47 H. H. Kelly to Governor-General of the Sudan, ‘Sudan–Uganda Boundary
Rectification’, 22 Apr. 1913, Sudan Archive Durham (hereafter SAD), Wingate
Papers 186/1/293; also in Sudan Intelligence Report 228, July 1913, TNA, WO
106/6225.
48 Kitchener to E. Grey, Cairo, 8 May 1914, TNA, WO 181/236.
49 Mark Leopold, InsideWest Nile: Violence, History and Representation on an African
Frontier (Oxford, 2005), 105–6.
50 A. E. Weatherhead, Annual Report on West Nile District, Uganda, 1914/15,
Bodleian Library, MSS.Afr.s.586; Allen, ‘Social Upheaval and the Struggle for
Community’, 113.
51 Bazley, ‘Reminiscences as District Officer’, 168.
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for territorial governance within and between colonial states.
This set up a lasting tension between ‘the social definition of
territory’ among pre-colonial clans, and the ‘territorial
definition of society’ imposed by colonial states;52 between the
flexibility and fluidity of clan affiliation, authority and settlement
patterns and the colonial vision of a permanent and precise tribal
boundary. The partial entanglement of clan territories into a new
patchwork of ethnic, administrative and national territorialities
would be a complicated and gradual (indeed still ongoing)
process that was little noticed or remarked by colonial officials.
Yet this process would draw clan territoriality into even the
highest levels of inter-colonial border negotiations by the 1930s.
II
AN EMERGING PATCHWORK: LOCAL TERRITORIALIZATION UNDER
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1920S–1940S
After the First World War, colonial territorial ambitions were
largely confined within agreed boundaries and directed towards
the ordering of space within these. In this ‘age of territory’, Maier
emphasizes the spreading and powerful idea that identity
space and political space should be congruent.53 In the African
context this manifested in colonial attempts to construct
territorial hierarchies of chiefdoms and ethnically defined local
government districts, within which subjects could be controlled
and taxed.54 Boundaries between colonial territories were now
subject less to European rivalries than to the same imperatives of
containment and regulation of colonial subjects that drove
internal territorial ordering. This was given added urgency in
the case of the Sudan–Uganda boundary by concerns about the
northward spread of sleeping sickness. But even in this era,
colonial ambitions to map, impose and regulate boundaries did
not follow through into the creation of a clear boundary line
between Sudan and Uganda, or succeed in confining people
within territorial chiefdoms, districts or colonies. That these
territories began to materialize owes far more instead to the
52 Gray, Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa, 19.
53 Maier, Once Within Borders, 3.
54 Mbembe, ‘At the Edge of the World’, 265–6; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and
Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996).
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initiative of local administrators and chiefs with more direct
interests in clarifying or extending the boundaries of their
jurisdictional patches.
The sleeping sickness campaign was one of the most centrally
directed interventions in the borderlands, yet the boundary that it
created was not a clear line but a wide uninhabited no-man’s-
land, which in the long run has contributed more confusion
than clarity to the borderline. The creation of boundaries as
sanitary cordons has earlier parallels in European history.55 In
colonial Africa, the whole approach to sleeping sickness was
territorial and focused on preventing its spread across
borders.56 This justified the creation of ‘an uninhabited belt of
ten miles on each side of the Sudan–Uganda boundary’ through a
coercive resettlement programme.57 ‘My uncles resisted moving,
so the British administration set their houses on fire to drive them
out of the land by force’.58 Colonial officers and Anglican
missionaries in Sudan reported continuing cross-border
movement on hidden pathways by people ‘visiting their Uganda
relatives’, despite the threat of punishment.59 But the extended
relocation of the borderland inhabitants was nevertheless brought
up by interviewees as a key aspect of boundary creation:
The [clan] are in both South Sudan and Uganda; I am from the Uganda
side . . . The [clan members] here speak Ma’di and there they speak Kuku.
The British . . . divided us into Ugandans and Sudanese; we became Ma’di
and Kuku . . . [The clan members] on both sides know each other and do
not intermarry; we have one grandfather. Because of sleeping sickness,
55 Sahlins, Boundaries.
56 Heather Bell, Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899–1940
(Oxford, 1999); Maryinez Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping
Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900–1940 (Cambridge, 1992); Maryinez Lyons ‘Foreign
Bodies: The History of Labour Migration as a Threat to Public Health in Uganda’, in
Nugent and Asiwaju (eds.), African Boundaries.
57 Sleeping Sickness Annual Report 1923, National Records Office, Sudan
(hereafter NRO), Mongalla 1/6/39. See also Equatoria Province Monthly Diary,
Apr. 1947, Mar. 1949, NRO, Dakhlia 57/2/5; Yei District Monthly Diary, May–
June 1942, Dec. 1943, Feb., Apr. 1944, NRO, Equatoria 2/24/87; Leopold,
‘Crossing the Line’, 470; Collins, ‘Sudan–Uganda Boundary’; Allen, ‘Social
Upheaval and the Struggle for Community’, 126.
58 Interview with senior official from Kajokeji in the state government, Juba, 7 Sept.
2014.
59 Rev. Finch, Kajo Kaji Annual Letter, 10 July 1935, Church Missionary Society
Archive, Birmingham (hereafter CMS), G3 AL; Sleeping Sickness Annual Report,
1923, NRO, Mongalla 1/6/39.
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the British took us to Marale, near the Nile, and those on the other side
were moved to Kansuk, so that divided [the clan].60
While sleeping sickness was in itself a very real concern, it also
provided district officials with the opportunity to resettle people
in more concentrated villages along the roads and closer to the
government-recognized chiefs. Both colonial administrations
had established a new institution of chiefship, known among
Bari-speakers like the Kuku as the matat lo gela/miri, ‘the chief
of the whites/government’.61 In both Kajokeji and Moyo, the
recognized chiefs had some prior authority as rainmakers or
war leaders. But the idea of a single chief having executive
authority over multiple clans was alien, and their new role as
the tax collectors and enforcers of colonial orders was often a
fraught one. The governments gave them their own courts and
police to enhance their authority, and sought to establish
territorial chiefdoms within which they would collect taxes and
maintain roads. But chiefly jurisdiction retained considerable
uncertainty as to whether it was strictly territorially defined, as
the governor of Sudan’s Equatoria province (in which Kajokeji
sub-district was located) complained in 1947:
We must have things in terms of territorial as opposed to tribal or clan
administration, though of course the ideal is for the two to administer
[sic]. We cannot permit persons to live in one Chiefs [sic] area and owe
allegiance to another chief. If people want to change their chief they must
also be prepared to move their villages and cultivations.62
Recent oral accounts reflect this uncertainty:
Our people settled around the valleys and hills, but the British moved
them to live along the roads . . . So proper demarcation of boundaries
was not easy — you find people from a particular clan were living far away
from their indigenous community. So the chief had to go a long way to
60 Interview with male local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, Uganda, 14 Oct.
2014. Also interviewswith a female district councillor whose clan was similarly divided
by the border, Moyo, Uganda, 10 Oct. 2014; with male retired engineer known as a
Kuku community elder, Juba, 3 Aug. 2013; with a senior official from Kajokeji in the
state government, Juba, 7 Sept. 2014; and with two clan land custodians, Wudu,
Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 19 Sept. 2014. Evidence of deserted settlements
lying ‘squarely’ across the later administrative border was noticed by a British DC
of West Nile District, Uganda, in 1958: Bazley, ‘Reminiscences as District Officer’,
226–8.
61 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan.
62 B. V. Marwood, Governor of Equatoria Province, to DC Juba District, 29 Mar.
1947, South Sudan National Archives, Juba (hereafter SSNA), EP 66.D.8.
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collect taxes from those people somewhere, crossing many boundaries on
the way.63
Perhaps reflecting change over time, others asserted the opposite:
‘People knew in the British time where the tax collection
boundaries were because chiefs cannot collect tax in another
area’.64 In an attempt to keep control of people within
chiefdoms, chiefs had to keep registers of taxpayers (that is,
adult men) and update these annually; compulsion and
remuneration for tax collection gave chiefs a vested interest in
trying to keep people within their jurisdiction.65 As the Sudan
administration began to condone cross-border labour migration
to the plantations in southern Uganda, it was chiefs and elders in
Equatoria who complained about its ‘very unsettling effect’ and
the loss of the young men’s labour and taxes.66 In the later 1930s,
chiefs were also made responsible for issuing the official sleeping
sickness passes required to cross the border legally (and which
were contingent on the payment of poll tax), giving them a further
role in border governance.67
The devolution of tax collection to local chiefs and district
officials would be a recurrent factor motivating local-level
attempts to clarify and enforce the Sudan–Uganda boundary, in
order to define the boundaries of local taxation regimes. It
prompted the first local-level attempt to demarcate a clearer
line in the early 1930s, when the neighbouring British district
commissioners (DCs) conducted a ‘border march’ with their
chiefs to agree ‘provisionally, where the boundary was’ by
marking ‘prominent trees’ and ‘rocky outcrops’.68 The creation
of the border thus involved the entwining of British officials’ and
63 Interview with male local politician from Kajokeji, Juba, 9 Sept. 2014. Also
interviews with male clan land custodian, Mondikolok, Kajokeji County, South
Sudan, 13 Sept. 2014; with village headman, Kajokeji County 17 Sept. 2014; and
with male local politician, Kajokeji County, 24 Sept. 2014.
64 Interview with male teacher/historian/political officer, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 28 Sept. 2014.
65 See also Lentz, ‘Decentralization, the State and Conflicts over Local Boundaries
in Northern Ghana’, 905–6.
66 Equatoria Province Monthly Diary, Mar. 1938, NRO, CS 57/7/29; Equatoria
Province Monthly Diary, Sept. 1941, NRO, CS 57/14/53; F. J. Finch, 1939 Diocesan
Review, CMS, G3 S1/7-9.
67 Yei District Annual Report, 1939, NRO, EP 2/26/94; Equatoria Province
Monthly Diaries, 1937, NRO, Civ Sec 57/4/17.
68 John Winder, ‘Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, A-E Sudan 1930–
33’ (1979), SAD 541/7/22-23.
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chiefs’ visions of its geography from the outset, as well as being
shaped by natural features.
The DCs’ demarcation, or ‘red line’ (see Map, line 4), became
the basis for fresh intergovernmental attempts to agree on a final
definition of the boundary in the 1930s. But both governments
were clearly influenced by the claims of their own subjects, and so
local territorial interests reached a surprisingly high level of
government dialogue: while the Governor of Uganda asserted
Ma’di claims to fishing rights on the Nile, the Governor-
General of the Sudan expressed ‘grave misgiving’ that the
boundary ‘would deprive the Sudan tribes of the ancestral
rainmaking sites to which they attach so much importance’,
and even named several specific clans with claims to territory as
far south as Mount Midigo (Map, lines 2–3).69 No final
settlement was reached, however. As the sleeping sickness
restrictions were lifted and people returned to the border areas
in the 1940s, the uncertainty of the borderline became more
contentious. In 1943, twelve Kuku hunters were killed,
reportedly just south of the Kayo/Ayo stream. The authorities
reacted swiftly to try to prevent retaliatory conflict and an
individual Ma’di man was executed for the killing.70 But it is
striking how frequently interviewees recounted this incident
without prompting, as an origin of ongoing Kuku–Ma’di
tensions and a motive for revenge on both sides.71 Hunting
conventions were one of the primary ways in which authority
over land is said to have been recognized: ‘In the past when
people hunted or trapped animals, they give the foreleg to the
landlord, or he will curse you. So everyone knows whose land
69 Governor-General of the Sudan, Khartoum, to Governor of Uganda, 26 Oct.
1933, and B. H. Bourdillon, Governor of Uganda, to Governor-General of the Sudan,
10 July 1933, TNA, FO 141/723/22. For a similar case of provincial bias over an
internal boundary, see Christopher Vaughan, ‘The Rizeigat–Malual Borderland
during the Condominium: The Limits of Legibility’, in Vaughan, Schomerus and
de Vries (eds.), Borderlands of South Sudan.
70 Yei District MonthlyDiary, Dec. 1943, June–Sept. 1944,Feb., April 1945, NRO,
Equatoria 2/24/87; correspondence in Uganda National Archives, Kampala
(hereafter UNA), C-series Box 8, no. C.389.
71 Interviews with clan land custodian/church pastor, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 19 Sept. 2014; with male church pastor, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 20 Sept. 2014; with retired male local government officer, Moyo,
Uganda, 10 Oct. 2014; and with two male clan elders, near Moyo, Uganda, 21 May
2017.
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it is’.72 The incident may thus have reflected ongoing disputes
and uncertainties over land and boundaries as people returned
from extended displacement.73
Hints such as these in both the colonial records and local
memory indicate that clan territoriality was on occasion
asserted vociferously enough to reach the attention of local and
even central governments, and that there is a long history to
contemporary disputes over the relation between clan territory
and the international boundary. Far from clarifying the
borderline, the colonial governments had established
considerable uncertainty over it by their unresolved
negotiations and their creation of a wide no-man’s-land as a
cordon sanitaire. The boundary that came closest to being
accepted was the ‘red line’ made by district-level officials and
chiefs in around 1930 (recorded as the ‘1936 ad hoc
administrative agreement’, line 4 on Map), driven by local
administrative imperatives and the convenience of using
prominent natural features. But this does not appear to have
been mapped in any detail and it clearly left unresolved
questions over the reach of chiefs’ jurisdictions as well as clan
territorial claims in the borderlands.
III
PATCHWORK NATIONALISMS: DISTRICT POLITICS AND NATIONAL
CONFLICTS, 1950S–1980S
Reflecting the wider associations of nationalism with territoriality in
the mid-twentieth century, the leaders of newly independent African
states would be swift to enshrine the existing colonial boundaries as
their national borders.74 Indeed, central government interest in the
72 Interview with male teacher/historian/political officer, Wudu, Kajokeji County,
South Sudan, 28 Sept. 2014; also interview with senior official from Kajokeji in the
state government, Juba, South Sudan, 7 Sept. 2014.
73 ‘Position of the Kuku Community on the disputed land along the common
border with neighbouring communities of Moyo and Yumbe Districts’ (n.d.,
c.2009–10), copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-County Office, Moyo District,
Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014.
74 ‘Introduction: The Paradox of African Boundaries’, in Nugent and Asiwaju,
African Boundaries, 5–6 (editors’ intro.); Herbst, States and Power, 97–112; Peter
Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa
and Europe (Chicago, 2009), 30. On the wider effects of nationalism on territoriality
in the twentieth century, see, for example, Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.),
Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and
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Uganda–Sudan boundary was at its height in the 1950s and 1960s.
Sudan’s independence in 1956 followed an uprising in parts of
Southern Sudan, where the new, largely northern Sudanese,
administration was therefore preoccupied with pursuing the
remnants of what it termed ‘mutineers’ and ‘outlaws’, many of
whom took refuge in the Uganda borderlands.75 This produced
some tension with the still-colonial government of Uganda, and
the British were eager to resolve the boundary delimitation before
Uganda too became independent. But efforts to establish a
boundary commission were hampered by the fact that Uganda’s
border with Kenya also needed to be resolved, and the British
government in Kenya was wary of stirring up the unresolved
issue of its own borders with Sudan and Ethiopia. Several years
ofhigh-level government correspondence over the Sudan–Uganda
border still failed to produce a resolution by the time Uganda
became independent in 1962.76 Even in this era of nationalism
and centralizing state authoritarianism, it was thus largely at the
local level of government that more practical attempts would
be made to create and administer the international boundary. At
this district level, the transfer of rule from British to Ugandan or
Sudanese administrators, councillors and political representatives
produced an intensified interest and investment in local state
territory, and it was these interests that would primarily drive
disputes over both internal and external borders.
By the late colonial period, districts were becoming the primary
territorial units not only of local government administrations but
also of emerging political organization and representation. Local
government reforms from the late 1930s were not successful in
(n. 74 cont.)
Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington, 2013); Maier, Once Within Borders; Pittaway,
‘National Socialism and the Production of German–Hungarian Borderland Space
on the Eve of the Second World War’.
75 Øystein H. Rolandsen, ‘A False Start: Between War and Peace in the Southern
Sudan, 1956–62’, Journal of African History, lii (2011); Øystein H. Rolandsen and
Cherry Leonardi, ‘Discourses of Violence in the Transition from Colonialism to
Independence in Southern Sudan, 1955–1960’, Journal of Eastern African Studies,
viii (2014).
76 See extensive correspondence on Sudan/Uganda/Kenya boundaries in TNA: FO
371/119660, CO 822/954, FO 371/155531, FO 371/159116, CO 822/2818, FCO
141/18458, FO 371/165692, FO 371/165693, FO 371/173190; and Governor of
Kenya to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 Jan. 1961, Gulu District Record
Office, Uganda (hereafter GDRO), Box 33, File C.LAN.4.
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their aim of diverting African political energies from nationalism,
but they established the district as a focus for political action and
ambition — often understood, in Uganda at least, in ethnic
terms.77 One effect was to produce demands for new
independent districts, and to generate tensions over district
boundaries, sparked by localized jurisdictional interests.78 For
example, disputes over tax collection along the Madi–Acholi
district boundary in Uganda were reported to be driven
primarily by chiefs, while their people enjoyed close relations
and had little interest in the boundary.79 New motives for
administrative independence were also emerging among local
elites through the district-level organization of cotton
cooperatives and ginneries, and by the basis of political
constituencies in administrative boundaries.80 Madi (later
Moyo) gained full district status in 1962, according to its new
Ugandan DC, because its people ‘had for a long time wished
to have a separate District having nothing to do with either West
Nile or Acholi Districts’.81 Already in 1964, ‘certain hard
feelings seem to have developed between the people of Aringa
County in West Nile District and their neighbours in Madi
77 Cherry Gertzel, ‘Kingdoms, Districts and the Unitary State: Uganda 1945–
1962’, in D. A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, iii (Oxford,
1976); H. B. Hansen, Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda (Uppsala, 1977);
Nelson Kasfir, ‘Introduction: The Districts and the Center’, in Barkan et al.,
Uganda District Government and Politics; Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South
Sudan; Cherry Leonardi and Chris Vaughan, ‘ ‘‘We are Oppressed and Our Only Way
is to Write to Higher Authority’’: The Politics of Claim and Complaint in the
Peripheries of Condominium Sudan’, in Emma Hunter (ed.), Citizenship,
Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present
(Athens, Ohio, 2018); Chris Vaughan, ‘Reinventing the Wheel? Local Government
and Neo-Traditional Authority in Late-Colonial Northern Sudan’, International
Journal of African Historical Studies, xliii (2010).
78 Pamela Khanakwa, ‘Inter-Communal Violence and Land Rights: Bugisu–
Bugwere Territorial Boundary Conflict’, MISR Working Papers, No. 6 (Kampala,
2012).
79 DC Acholi District to Asst. DC West Nile I/C Madi, 2 Oct. 1951; Asst. DC West
Nile I/C Madi to DC Acholi District, 27 June 1952; Asst. DC Madi District to DC
Madi District, 1 May 1962; DC West Nile District to DC Acholi District, 18 June
1962, all GDRO, Box 531, File C.LAN.5.
80 Madi Sub-District Annual Report, 1956, Makerere University Library, Kampala
(hereafter MUL) Microfilms. See Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 28,
on the increasing dependence of African rural elites on agricultural income more
widely from the 1940s.
81 Madi District Annual Report, 1963, MUL Microfilms.
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District’ as a result of Aringa fears that Madi District sought to
annex the county.82
Districts in Southern Sudan were not usually defined in such
overtly ethnic terms, though their territories were still shaped
by colonial understandings of tribal boundaries.83 But the
identification of chiefs and councillors with their district was
clearly strengthening in the 1940s and 1950s,84 and here too
on occasion disputes over hunting rights or settlement and
taxation could prompt the revisiting of district boundaries.85
Indeed the colonial district territories have retained considerable
salience up to now in South Sudan, despite later rearrangements:
in 2014, the new rebel opposition proposed a federal government
structure based on the twenty-one colonial districts and their
boundaries.86 In Uganda the colonial district boundaries have
been retained even as districts have been internally subdivided
in recent years (usually along former sub-district/county
boundaries).87 Colonial administration in both countries thus
established a patchwork pattern of chiefdoms and local
government units with lasting effect. Chiefs, local government
officials and councillors in Kajokeji and neighbouring Moyo
and Aringa were increasingly invested in the territoriality of
their administrations, and hence in the international boundary
that would be created by first Sudan’s independence in 1956 and
then Uganda’s in 1962.
In 1958, it was disputes over ‘the jurisdiction of local chiefs and
the collection of taxes’ that prompted a meeting between the
Sudanese DC of Yei and the British Assistant DC of West Nile
to resolve disputes between chiefs at Keriwa, on the border
82 West Nile District Intelligence Committee Report, 22 May–8 July 1964, UNA
President’s Office, Confidential Papers, Box 41, File S.6190/19.
83 The Condominium government shifted administrative policy from separating to
amalgamating potentially conflicting groups: see Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Tribal
Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer–Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf
Valleys, c.1860–1976’, Journal of African History, xxiii (1982).
84 Leonardi and Vaughan, ‘ ‘‘We are Oppressed and Our Only Way is to Write to
Higher Authority’’ ’.
85 For example DC Yei, ‘Note on Meeting between District Commissioner Yei and
the West Bank Bari of Juba District to Adjust the Boundary between Yei and Juba
Districts’, Kajokeji, 10 Mar. 1942, SSNA, EP 16.A.1.1.
86 Mareike Schomerus and Lovise Aalen (eds.),Considering the State: Perspectives on
South Sudan’s Subdivision and Federalism Debate (London, 2016), 6.
87 Morris Adam Nsamba, ‘Decentralization and Territorial Politics: The Dilemma
of Constructing and Managing Identities in Uganda’, Critical African Studies, v
(2013), 49–51.
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between Kajokeji and Aringa County.88 They discovered that
their maps differed but agreed to adopt the Ugandan version of
the line ‘because it was easier to follow on the ground’,
demonstrating again that administrative pragmatism and
natural features did more to shape the boundary than high-level
directives.89 This was apparent again two years later, when a
Sudan chief tried to collect taxes from Kuku people who had
already paid taxes to the Uganda government.90 The British
DC of Moyo insisted that Jale Hill, on the road between Moyo
and Kajokeji, had been accepted as ‘the locally recognized border’
for the past twenty years.91 At a meeting held at Kajokeji in 1960,
however, the Sudanese representatives disputed the boundary
line at both Jale and Keriwa hills. The meeting nevertheless
agreed that the existing ‘administrative line should be
recognized as a purely temporary expedient’; that the current
tax arrangements in the borderlands should be preserved and
that new settlement in a four-mile-wide border zone deterred.
The accompanying sketch map was ‘deliberately left vague’
(Map, line 5).92 In other words the border remained a zone, not
a line: a no-man’s-land, as it had been under the sleeping sickness
restrictions. Clearly this agreement did not solve the problem: just
a year later, a member of the West Nile District Council in
Uganda asked whether the chair was aware ‘that there is
dispute in Kerua [Keriwa] because there is no definite
boundary lines in the County’, and, if so, ‘what steps are being
taken to stop such a confusion?’93
As conflict in Southern Sudan intensified by the mid 1960s,
district-level intelligence reports from the Ugandan border
districts increasingly focused on the accelerating refugee influx
88 Acting Governor of Uganda to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
12 Feb. 1960, TNA, CO 822/954.
89 Bazley, ‘Reminiscences as District Officer’, 235.
90 Acting Governor of Uganda to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
12 Feb. 1960, TNA, CO 822/954.
91 W. B. H. Duke, DC I/C Madi-Moyo, to C. Powell Cotton, Northern Province
Commissioner, 28 May 1959, UNA Northern Province Box 2, GAM.2.
92 Acting Governor of Uganda to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
20 Dec. 1960, enclosing ‘Notes of a Meeting Held at Kajo Kaji on November 7th
between Sudanese and Uganda Representatives to Discuss the Sudan/Uganda
Border’ and ‘Sketch Map to Illustrate the Ad Hoc Administrative Agreement’,
TNA, CO 822/2818.
93 Councillor B. Moro, ‘Question No. 2 1961’, in Minutes of the Seventh Meeting
of the West Nile District Council, 17–19 Jan. 1961, UNA Northern Province B3 002.
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and military activities in the borderlands. Many of the refugees
took advantage of their close relations across the border to settle
locally in Moyo and West Nile. But already in 1964, a District
Intelligence report recommended the removal of Sudanese
refugees from West Nile to prevent them laying claim or
bringing conflict to ‘Uganda’s soil’.94 Over the next two years,
the borderlands became increasingly insecure, as the ‘Anyanya’
rebel movement activity and Sudan government counter-
insurgency intensified. In 1966, Sudan army soldiers were
reported to have crossed the border at Afoji where they killed
one refugee and took others to Sudan. The DC Madi protested
this ‘invasion’ to the Ugandan Prime Minister and requested a
Ugandan army presence in the district, and for the refugees to be
relocated further inside Uganda.95 Local government officials
thus appealed to the idea of state territorial sovereignty to claim
greater central government support in the borderlands.
That support came in the form of an army operation to relocate
the Sudanese refugees away from the borderlands, at the same
time as the Ugandan army was increasingly co-operating with the
Sudan army against the Anyanya rebels.96 This is another episode
in the border history that is bitterly recalled in current narratives
in Kajokeji. Yet in Moyo too, interviewees expressed considerable
ambivalence about the coerciveness of the operation.97 At the
time, the Ugandan DC of West Nile had to respond to
complaints about it in the district council:
The operation was intended to take away refugees from the border and put
them in an area far from the border and where they could be registered and
known. We must know who are living in Uganda. At present people are
94 West Nile District Intelligence Report, 15 Sept. 1964, UNA Presidential Office,
Confidential Papers, B41 S.6190/19.
95 G. W. M. Wabomba, DC Madi, to Permanent Secretary, Office of the Prime
Minister, 13 Mar. 1966, UNAOffice of the Prime Minister: Madi District Intelligence
Committee Reports, 1960s (copy kindly shared with the author by Professor Tim
Allen).
96 West Nile District Intelligence Committee Meetings, Sept.–Oct. 1966, UNA
Presidential Office, Confidential Papers, B41 S.6190/19; Kenneth Ingham, Obote:
A Political Biography (Abingdon, 1994), 117.
97 ‘Position of the Kuku Community on the Disputed Land along the Common
Border with Neighbouring Communities of Moyo and Yumbe Districts’ (n.d.,
c.2009–10), copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-County Office, Moyo District,
Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014; Group discussion among chiefs, elders and youth at
Keriwa, Kajokeji County, 26 Sept. 2014; Interviews with male elder from Logoba,
Moyo, Uganda, 26 May 2017, and with retired male local government officer, Moyo,
Uganda, 10 Oct. 2014.
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entering Uganda at will, like a market, and as if this is a ‘‘no-man’s’’ land.
It has been very difficult to plan services for our people because we just
don’t know who are living in Uganda. Even this Council has already
experienced this from shortage of drugs at the dispensaries.98
This statement epitomizes a recurrent local government
discourse, protesting at unregulated cross-border movement
and citing service provision and administrative imperatives as
the basis for asserting territorial sovereignty.
Yet the border itself has frequently taken the form of a no-
man’s-land rather than a clear line. This was again exacerbated
by the intensifying Sudanese conflict in late 1966: ‘the border up
to a radius of four miles inside Uganda became more and more
dangerous to live in and people are increasingly deserting their
homes’.99 Even in the midst of such insecurity, there are hints that
the borderline was already a source of tension in some of the
villages disputed up to now between Moyo and Kajokeji:
It is also rumoured that some refugees of Afoji and Chunyu have refused
to move inward and claimed that those places belong to the Sudan and if
the Madi would try to interfere with their settlement they are prepared to
fight by any means. It is believed that the Anyanya would be willing to
assist them in case of any fight [emphasis added].100
Meanwhile in 1967, the government of Uganda under Milton
Obote published its own definition of the Sudan boundary in its
new constitution, running across the summits of Keriwa and Jale
hills, the latter now said to be marked with a surface beacon (Map,
line 6).101 This definition is alleged by Kajokeji leaders nowadays
to have resulted from a clandestine agreement between Obote
and the Sudan government, in exchange for Obote’s military
support against the Anyanya.102 Certainly it seems to have
received little attention at the time or subsequently, despite the
98 Minutes of the 19
th
Meeting of the West Nile District Council, 22–27 Aug. 1966,
Appendix A: Speech by the District Commissioner on 22 Aug. 1966, UNA NP B3
001.
99 Madi District Intelligence Report, 9–31 Dec. 1966, UNA Office of the Prime
Minister: Madi District Intelligence Committee Reports, 1960s (copy kindly shared
with the author by Professor Tim Allen).
100 Madi District Intelligence Report, 6–31 May 1966, UNA Office of the Prime
Minister: Madi District Intelligence Committee Reports, 1960s (copy kindly shared
with the author by Professor Tim Allen).
101 Government of Uganda, The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Entebbe,
1967); Taha, ‘Sudan–Uganda Boundary’.
102 Interviews in Kajokeji County, South Sudan, with male county councillor, 13
Sept. 2014; with elderly male university professor, 14 Sept. 2014; with male clan land
custodian/schoolteacher, 19 Sept. 2014; and with male schoolteacher/historian/
political officer, 28 Sept. 2014.
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vociferous Sudanese protests against such Ugandan claims in
1960; by 1967, Sudan was under a caretaker coalition
government, and both its international reputation in the region
and its territorial control in the border areas had been increasingly
eroded by the rebels.103
Indeed the local concerns over the border would receive
diminishing interest from either national government from now
on. Ugandan policy was shifting as Obote’s army chief, Idi Amin,
pursued closer relations with the Anyanya and their supporter,
Israel.104 Amin, who would seize power from Obote in the coup of
January 1971, was himself of a ‘liminal identity’ from the
westernmost Uganda–Sudan borderlands,105 and his period of
rule did much to further blur the international boundary;
Hansen suggests that ‘he regarded the national frontier as
penetrable and subordinate to ethnic considerations’.106 He
heavily recruited Southern Sudanese as well as West Nile
Ugandans into his military and security forces and
administration. The 1972 peace agreement in Sudan led to the
re-opening of the border and gradual return of Sudanese
refugees, and in subsequent years, peace and ‘cordial relations’
were reported, with ‘free movement and contact’ across the
border.107 Once again it was left to local and provincial
authorities to handle the implications of this movement. A
border meeting between the local administrations at Keriwa in
1974 resolved to tighten controls on cross-border movement of
people, livestock and trade goods and agreed that ‘People at
Keriwa village are to pay taxes where they want to and the
respective Chiefs to issue receipts’, suggesting that chiefly
jurisdictions were still uncertain in the borderland.108 Soon
after, Sudanese crossing into Uganda in this area complained of
being taxed again by the Ugandan local authorities, despite
carrying Sudanese poll-tax receipts.109
103 P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly,AHistory of the Sudan: From theComing of Islam to the
Present Day, 5th edn (Harlow, 2000), 162–3.
104 Robert O. Collins,AHistory ofModernSudan (Cambridge, 2008), 105; Ingham,
Obote, 134.
105 Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’, 471.
106 Hansen, Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda, 88.
107 Madi District Annual Reports, 1968–74, MUL, Africana G.EAU/M (058) 1.
108 Yei People’s Rural Council Monthly Report for March 1974, SSNA EP 57.D.3.
109 Yei People’s Rural Council Monthly Report for Sept. 1974, Oct. 1975, SSNA
EP 57.D.3.
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As the Ugandan economy collapsed in the later years of Amin’s
government, the informal economy, or ‘magendo’ emerged as a
major and enduring source of income and survival, creating new
vested interests in cross-border trade and smuggling.110 As
Tidemand points out, however, the collapse of the formal
economy in Uganda had limited impact on district
administrations, since their revenue base was ‘graduated taxes
and market dues rather than taxes on formal sector
incomes’.111 This also heightened the concerns about local tax
collection on both sides of the border, as local governments
struggled to get this revenue in the absence of central
government support.112
While Amin’s regime may have done more to blur and subvert
the international boundary than to define it, conversely it also
contributed to the hardening of internal boundaries in Uganda
and thus to the overall strengthening of a patchwork geography.
From 1972 the government began redrawing district and regional
boundaries, claiming ‘to meet the aspirations of various small
societies which had hitherto been pressed into unwanted
associations with their neighbours’.113 The move was ultimately
part of attempts to secure greater centralized control over the
districts, however, and local administrative positions were
increasingly taken over by military personnel. Divide-and-rule
tactics even within Amin’s home region of West Nile
contributed to the fragmentation of any regional identity and
the ‘contraction of boundaries’,114 a process that would only
accelerate in later decades.
Such local differentiation did not prevent reprisals against the
people of West Nile in general following Amin’s overthrow in
1979, leading to their flight across the Sudanese and Congolese
borders. Some Ma’di refugees settled among the Kuku of
110 Kate Meagher, ‘The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in
Northwestern Uganda’, Review of African Political Economy, xvii (1990); Kristof
Titeca, ‘Tycoons and Contraband: Informal Cross-Border Trade in West Nile,
North-Western Uganda’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, vi (2012).
111 Per Tidemand, ‘New Local State Forms and ‘‘Popular Participation’’ in
Buganda, Uganda’, in Peter Gibbon (ed.), The New Local Level Politics in East
Africa: Studies on Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya (Uppsala, 1994), 20.
112 Dennis A. Rondinelli, ‘Administrative Decentralisation and Economic
Development: The Sudan’s Experiment with Devolution’, Journal of Modern
African Studies, xix (1981).
113 D. A. Low, ‘Uganda Unhinged’, International Affairs, xlix (1973), 224.
114 Hansen, Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda, 97–119.
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Kajokeji and may have even ‘adopted a Kuku identity for a
period’.115 By around 1986, Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) attacks forced a reverse migration once again,
with both Ma’di and Kuku returning to Uganda. Again, many
Kuku were able to settle among relatives and friends in Moyo and
neighbouring districts.116 This capacity to self-settle near the
border and to shift ethnic or national identity has been an
important strategy for the borderland inhabitants. But refugee
movements also created tensions among them and sharpened
national identities. The relocation of Sudanese refugees from
Moyo to neighbouring districts in the late 1990s was referred to
by several interviewees as a cause of deteriorating relations, as one
man from Kajokeji emphasized:
In 1987 I left [Kajokeji] and ran just across the border and joined school
there [in Moyo]; I even went to school with some of the current leaders
there. There were always some tensions; we were seen as refugees. In
1997, when I was in Senior 4, we were evicted from Moyo; all the
refugees were sent away from Moyo and Metu because we were
foreigners . . . It was a really bad experience; it soured relations. We
were taken to Waka camp in 1997–8, and there were a lot of problems
with insecurity because of the West Nile Bank Front attacks.117
The Ugandan rebel West Nile Bank Front targeted the refugee
settlements from its bases across the border in Sudan because it
suspected refugees of supporting the SPLA, as was the Ugandan
government. More general refugee–host tensions emerged over
resources, services and jobs in the humanitarian agencies, and
Ugandans reportedly associated crime and insecurity with the
refugee presence.118 While refugee movements might in some
ways blur borders then, in other ways they could provoke the
defence of territorial interests among ‘hosts’, harden the
distinction between ‘nationals’ and ‘foreigners’ (particularly in
relation to land rights), and thus increase the value of territorial
belonging and homeland for refugees.119
115 Allen, ‘Social Upheaval and the Struggle for Community’, 216.
116 Ibid., 55.
117 Interview with male youth leader, Wudu, Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 28
Sept. 2014.
118 Lina Payne, Rebuilding Communities in a Refugee Settlement: A Casebook from
Uganda (Oxford, 1998).
119 Merkx, ‘Refugee Identities and Relief in an African Borderland’; Lucy Hovil,
‘Hoping for Peace, Afraid of War: The Dilemmas of Repatriation and Belonging on the
Borders of Uganda and South Sudan’, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper
No. 196 (Geneva, 2010).
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In recent years, debates over the disputed border areas often
focus on whether particular groups of people were settled in these
areas temporarily as refugees or were internally displaced within
their own country.120
Following the outbreak of war in Uganda in 1979, the Ma’di took refuge in
Dwani Wano. They were received warmly and allowed to settle among the
people before they were repatriated to Uganda. During this time the
Ma’di refugees paid taxes to Sudanese authorities. Now the district
local authorities in Moyo have extended claim over Dwani Wano
through which the disputed road passes. Yet the land is undoubtedly
Kuku land in which is located salt water where rituals used to be
performed.121
This statement from the ‘Kuku community’ reveals the
entanglement of a ritual landscape of clan-based authority with the
logics of state territoriality defined by the boundaries of taxation
regimes. These threads would be woven ever more closely into the
patchwork of local state territoriality from the 1990s, even as the
patches themselves were being cut up and re-stitched.
IV
‘TOO MANY CUSTODIANS OF BORDERS’? DECENTRALIZING
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY SINCE THE 1990S
With the end of the Cold War and growing attention to
‘globalization’ and regional integration policies in Europe,
Maier suggests that territorial priorities were becoming seen as
‘anachronistic’ in the West by the late twentieth century.122 The
revival of the East African Community in 2000 promised a similar
softening and opening of borders here, while peace agreements in
Sudan and Uganda in 2005 and 2006 enabled a massive
acceleration of cross-border trade and investment. In the same
period, however, disputes proliferated along this international
border, and over internal boundaries in both Uganda and
South(ern) Sudan, signifying an intensification rather than
120 Petition of the people of Moyo District to the Parliament of Uganda, presented
by Hon. Alero Aza Tom, MP, West Moyo County (n.d., c.2012), copied by the author
at the Lefori Sub-County Office, Moyo District, Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014.
121 ‘Position of the Kuku Community on the Disputed Land Along the Common
Border with Neighbouring Communities of Moyo and Yumbe Districts’ (n.d.,
c.2009–10), copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-County Office, Moyo District,
Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014.
122 Maier, Once Within Borders, 1.
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disappearance of territoriality — epitomized perhaps above all in
the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.123 Yet within
the new state and its neighbour Uganda, the overall effect has
been to strengthen state territorial sovereignty, as local
authorities and citizens appeal to its logics and assert its
boundaries in pursuit of local interests.
The localization of state power and territoriality has received
particular impetus from programmes of decentralization in both
Uganda and South Sudan since the 1990s.124 In Uganda, the
National Resistance Movement/Army of Yoweri Museveni
followed up its military victory in 1986 with the consolidation
of a five-tier system of Local (initially ‘Resistance’) Councils
(LCs), from village to district levels, with substantial financial
decentralization to the district councils. These reforms have
thus re-intensified the concentration of power and politics at
the district level, leading to heightened competition for
positions and to proliferating demands for the creation of new
districts, often expressed in ethnic terms. The result was an
increase from thirty-three districts in 1986 to 121 in 2017.125
Uganda’s LC system has been much heralded for bringing local
democracy, development and genuine decentralization after the
centralized authoritarianism of Obote and Amin. But critics have
also argued that new district creation has become an
electioneering and patrimonial strategy, rewarding local
politicians loyal to the ruling party, and confining much
political debate and competition to the district rather than
national level.126 Campaigns for new districts have ‘allowed
123 The basis of the new international Sudan–South Sudan boundary on colonial
province boundaries ensured that the creation of the new state did not entirely violate
the principle of maintaining colonial boundaries agreed by the Organisation for
African Unity in 1963: see Peter Hakim Justin and Lotje De Vries, ‘Governing
Unclear Lines: Local Boundaries as a (Re)source of Conflict in South Sudan’,
Journal of Borderlands Studies, xxxiv (2019), 32; Katerˇina Rudincova´, ‘When
Colonial Borders Still Matter: The Emergence of South Sudan’, Journal of African
History, Politics and Society, i (2015).
124 As elsewhere: see, for example, Lentz, ‘Decentralization, the State and Conflicts
over Local Boundaries in Northern Ghana’.
125 Republic of Uganda Ministry of Local Government Factsheet (Kampala, 2017), at
5http://molg.go.ug/sites/default/files/MoLG%20-%20%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf4
(accessed 12 Oct. 2018).
126 Nsamba, ‘Decentralization and Territorial Politics’, 48, 53; Nicholas Awortwi
and A. H. J. Helmsing, ‘In the Name of Bringing Services Closer to the People?
Explaining the Creation of New Local Government Districts in Uganda’,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, lxxx (2014).
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local extremists to assume power and exacerbate ethnic tensions’,
leading to increasing conflicts over old and new boundaries.127
The channelling of aid and development directly to the districts
by international agencies has also furthered the ‘build-up of
assets’ at this level.128 This reflects broader processes by which
development programmes assume a territorial definition of
recipient communities or localities and thus enhance the value
of controlling local administrative territories.129
Similar processes are evident across the border in South
Sudan, where by the late 1990s the SPLM/A had begun to
establish its own local government system in the ‘liberated’
areas of Equatoria, including Kajokeji. Districts were renamed
counties, and new sub-county divisions created, often based on
chiefdoms. These structures would be formalized by the Local
Government Act of 2009 and inherited by the new state in
2011.130 There has been little sign here of the extent of
decentralization occurring in Uganda. But local governments
still became the focus for competition over their limited
resources, in the form of intermittently salaried positions and
control over local taxes, court revenues, land transactions and
aid projects. As in Uganda, there has therefore been a rapid
fragmentation and proliferation of new counties and lower
units, including chiefdoms, and widespread disputes and
conflicts over boundaries.131
The increasing value of controlling local government territories
has been furthered by growing concern and competition over land
in both countries, and the associated politicization of customary
127 Elliott D. Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security
and Development, viii (2008).
128 Ibid.
129 Pierre-Yves le Meur, ‘State Making and the Politics of the Frontier in Central
Benin’, Development and Change, xxxvi (2006); Thomas J. Bassett, Chantal Blanc-
Pamard and Jean Boutrais, ‘Constructing Locality: The Terroir Approach in West
Africa’, Africa, lxxvii (2007); Rony Emmenegger, ‘Decentralization and the Local
Developmental State: Peasant Mobilization in Oromiya, Ethiopia’, Africa, lxxxvi
(2016); Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging.
130 Government of Southern Sudan, The Local Government Act 2009 (Juba, 2009);
Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan.
131 Justin and de Vries, ‘Governing Unclear Lines’; Schomerus and Aalen,
Considering the State; Cherry Leonardi and Martina Santschi, Dividing Communities
in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: Boundary Disputes and Land Governance
(London, 2016); Frahm, ‘Making Borders and Identities in South Sudan’;
Cormack, ‘Boundaries are Galaxies’; Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow
Liberation (London, 2015).
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land governance. In first Uganda and later South Sudan,
customary land tenure has been given novel constitutional and
legal recognition by the current ruling regimes, accompanied by
declarations that ‘land belongs to the people’. Yet at the same
time, state and military interests have frequently ridden
roughshod over these rights in the commercial exploitation of
land and natural resources, generating new insecurities over
land tenure among ordinary people.132 In addition, the rapid
growth of cities, towns and smaller market centres along roads
has created new pressures on land in particular areas, and fuelled
an unprecedented market for leases or land titles, formal and
informal. The new value of land was further enhanced by a
revival of commercial farming, land leases for government or
NGO infrastructure and development projects, and a vague but
confident anticipation of ‘investors’, which was particularly
intensified by oil and mineral prospecting in north-western
Uganda.133 Both northern Uganda and South Sudan were the
focus for massive externally funded programmes of post-conflict
reconstruction after 2005, which if nothing else contributed to a
boom in infrastructural development, construction and cross-
border trade.134
This combination of factors had an obvious impact on
customary land governance just when it had also been given
new legal recognition. Local governments established land
132 Leonardi and Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern
Uganda, 73–82; David K. Deng, ‘ ‘‘Land Belongs to the Community’’:
Demystifying the ‘‘Global Land Grab’’ in Southern Sudan’, Land Deals Politics
Initiative, Working Paper 4 (Cape Town, 2011); Judy Adoko and Simon Levine, A
LandMarket for Poverty Eradication?ACase Study of the Impact ofUganda’s LandActs on
Policy Hopes for Development and Poverty Eradication (Kampala, 2005); Giuliano
Martiniello, ‘Accumulation by Dispossession, Agrarian Change and Resistance in
Northern Uganda’, Makerere Institute of Social Research Working Paper No. 12
(Kampala, 2013).
133 Leonardi and Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern
Uganda, 97–103. Interviews with female state government advisor and with male
Land Commission official, both in Juba, South Sudan, 23 July 2015; Julius Kiiza,
Lawrence Bategeka and Sarah Ssewanyana, ‘Righting Resource-Curse Wrongs in
Uganda: The Political Economy of Oil Discovery and the Management of Popular
Expectations’, Mawazo, x (2011).
134 Wolfgang Zeller, ‘Get It While You Can: Governance between Wars in the
Uganda–South Sudan Borderland’, in Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers
(eds.), Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, and Borderlands (New York, 2013);
Mareike Schomerus and Kristof Titeca, ‘Deals and Dealings: Inconclusive Peace
and Treacherous Trade along the South Sudan–Uganda Border’, Africa Spectrum,
xlvii (2012).
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committees and worked with clan land authorities and customary
chiefs to handle increasingly lucrative land transactions and
disputes.135 Competition for land was generating more
exclusionary definitions of land rights, based more strictly on
patrilineal descent, fuelling disputes over history, genealogy and
law even among close neighbours and relatives.136 Similar
principles were extended to the level of administrative
boundaries, as neighbouring local governments laid claim to
territory and key sites like markets on the basis of ethnic and
customary land boundaries. Rights and access to resources
were becoming defined by whether or not one could claim
ancestral belonging to a particular clan and ethnic territory, so
that migrants and minorities feared having less rights unless they
could claim their own sub-territory with its own administration.
As well as driving the proliferation of new administrative units,
these logics presume that administrative boundaries should align
with clan and ethnic boundaries. The historical knowledge and
spiritual authority claimed by clan land authorities has thus
gained new political and even commercial value as the basis for
defining control over and rights to land and territory.137 The
effect has been to further rework and entangle clan territoriality
in the stitching, cutting and re-stitching of the seams between
local administrative patches in both states, and to engage more
people than ever in this work as they seek to protect or extend their
own land rights.
Horizontal tensions between neighbouring territorial
administrations have tended to work ultimately to reinforce
vertical political relations, thus strengthening rather than
fragmenting state power. By 2014, both Moyo District in
Uganda and Kajokeji County in South Sudan were embroiled
135 Leonardi and Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern
Uganda, 82–96; Tiernan Mennen, Customary Law and Land Rights in South Sudan
(Oslo, 2012); Rasmus H. Pedersen et al., ‘Land Tenure and Economic Activities in
Uganda: A Literature Review’, Danish Institute for International Studies Working
Paper 13 (Copenhagen, 2012).
136 Leonardi and Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern
Uganda, 97–134.
137 Interview with male county councillor, Wudu, Kajokeji County, South Sudan,
14 Sept. 2014; Justin and de Vries, ‘Governing Unclear Lines’; Leonardi and
Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda; Johnson,
When Boundaries Become Borders; Anders Sjo¨gren, ‘Battles over Boundaries: The
Politics of Territory, Identity and Authority in Three Ugandan Regions’, Journal of
Contemporary African Studies, xxxiii (2015).
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in multiple boundary disputes, including between Moyo and
neighbouring Yumbe District (formerly Aringa County).
Threats of bloodshed over this boundary compelled central
government intervention in the form of a delegation of junior
ministers and lands ministry personnel, which met with district
representatives in Moyo in 2017. The delegation sought to assert
the sovereignty and technical capacity of central state institutions:
‘the custodian of all borders is the Ministry of Lands; otherwise
there are too many custodians of borders’. But even state
technocratic solutions were vulnerable to local appropriation,
according to district spokespersons who claimed that the GPS
machine used in a previous demarcation attempt had been
programmed to understand only one of the local languages — a
potent expression of the way that seemingly neutral technologies
of state territoriality could become entangled in local territorial
rivalries. The delegation repeatedly criticized local politicians and
district administrations for inciting conflict, including by creating
new administrative subunits in the disputed areas: ‘We realize the
two local governments have rushed to those areas to put villages
and give names in their own tribal languages’.138
As we have seen, there is a long history to the idea that
boundaries could be carried by people, and to the strategy of
using local administration, taxation, infrastructure and services
to stretch the seams of the territorial patchwork. Even while the
Sudanese war was still ongoing in the 1990s, tensions were
reported in the long-disputed international borderland at
Keriwa, where, according to an SPLA officer, ‘the local people
(Sudanese) believe that these areas have been encroached upon’
by the Uganda local government authority having ‘extended
services — schools, health clinics and roads to these areas’ and
‘even gone further to encourage the local Sudanese people to pay
tax known in Uganda as ‘‘Machoro’’ ’. Border meetings held in
1997 had failed to resolve the issue, because the meetings were
only ‘locally initiated’ — once again, the border was being left to
local governance.139 The extension of Ugandan administration to
this border area remained contentious in 2014 among people in
138 Notes taken by author at a meeting in the Moyo People’s Hall, Moyo District,
Uganda, 29 May 2017.
139 Malual Ayom Dor, ‘Conflict and Cooperation between Uganda and Sudan: The
Impact of Transnational Ethnicity, 1962–2002’ (Makerere Univ. MA dissertation,
2003, 92–3).
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Liwolo Payam of Kajokeji County, who claimed that part of their
territory and people had become the sub-county of Keriwa in
Yumbe District:
The Uganda government brought services, so people considered Uganda
as the only government which helps them, but people in that sub-county
are on their own land, not Ugandan land; they did not go there as refugees.
But the Uganda government created positions for them as LCs, village
chiefs — that is the Uganda administration.140
Ugandan authorities argue that the ethnicity of the population
should be irrelevant to the international border line.141
The escalation of conflict over the international boundary from
around 2007 was similarly triggered by potent assertions of
administrative sovereignty, such as naming of villages,
construction of a road and telecommunication mast, and most
notably the extension of the Uganda national census — the most
powerful ‘instrument of modern territoriality’, according to
Gray142 — to disputed border areas in 2014. Commercial
farming initiatives by local elites in the fertile border zone also
contributed to the escalating tensions.143 Local government
leaders in Kajokeji were explicit about their strategies of staking
claims to disputed areas:
Before under the Arabs [Government of Sudan] there was no
development, so nobody bothered about the borders. But since 2005
there is change — now we are building schools at the border, at
Bamurye, to show the government presence . . . There are good
relations at the high level between South Sudan and Uganda — the
problems are at the local level, with the LCs.144
The Kajokeji–Moyo boundary, with its poor road connections,
was of much less significance to higher authorities than the major
border crossing points either side of it at Kaya and Nimule, where
140 Group discussion among chiefs, elders and youth at Keriwa, Kajokeji County,
26 Sept. 2014; interview with male local politician from Kajokeji, Juba, 9 Sept. 2014.
141 Interviews with local government official, Yumbe District, 1 June 2017, and with
young male community development officer, Moyo District, Uganda, 13 Oct. 2014.
142 Gray, Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa, 113.
143 Interview with local politician/businessman, Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 23
Sept. 2014, and with young male community development officer, Moyo District,
Uganda, 13 Oct. 2014; Petition of the people of Moyo District to the Parliament of
Uganda, presented by Hon. Alero Aza Tom, MP, West Moyo County (n.d., c.2012),
copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-County Office, Moyo District, Uganda, on 13
Oct. 2014.
144 Interview with local politician from Kajokeji County, Juba, 7 Sept. 2014, and
with another Kajokeji politician in Juba, 9 Sept. 2014; also attested by female district
councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 14 Oct. 2014.
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customs revenue was the focus of competition among different
levels of government.145 Local government leaders in both Moyo
and Kajokeji therefore complained at the lack of interest or
security provision from their own central governments, who
were said to see the dispute as ‘just a local border issue’.146 But
they also repeatedly petitioned the national governments for
support and to demand border demarcation, appealing to the
idea of territorial sovereignty.147 In 2011, for example, the
Moyo district chairman wrote to the Minister of Internal Affairs
complaining of South Sudanese incursions across the border and
requesting government action: ‘To make it abundantly clear that
the laws governing this nation are adhered to by all who are within
the territorial boundaries of the Republic of Uganda’.148
Similarly a district council member for Moyo emphasized that
‘it is also important to have marks so that the border is clear,
because this is a country’.149
Higher authorities responded by reiterating the joint directive
of the South(ern) Sudanese and Ugandan presidents in 2009
that major economic activities or projects in the border zone
should be suspended until a boundary commission had
resolved the borderline. Once again then, central government
policy worked to produce an effective no-man’s-land along the
border, which is also conspicuous in the mile-wide gap between
border posts on the main road between Kajokeji and Moyo. At
the same time, higher-level authorities urged ‘amicable
solutions’ at the local level and dialogue between chiefs and
145 Lotje de Vries, Facing Frontiers: Everyday Practice of State-Building in South
Sudan (Wageningen Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 2012).
146 Interviews with local politician and businessman, Moyo, Uganda, 6 Mar. 2017;
with male district councillor and with male retired government employee, Lefori,
Moyo District, Uganda, 21 May 2017; and with local politician from Kajokeji in
Juba, South Sudan, 5 Aug. 2013.
147 See similar cases in Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Too Much Water under the Bridge:
Internationalization of the Sudan–South Sudan Border and Local Demands for its
Regulation’ and Joshua Craze, ‘Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei’,
both in Vaughan, Schomerus and de Vries, Borderlands of South Sudan; also Dereje
Feyissa, ‘More State than the State? Anywaa’s Call for a Rigidification of the Ethio–
Sudanese Border’, in Feyissa and Hoehne, Borders and Borderlands.
148 LCV Chairperson Vukoni Jimmy Okudi to Hon. Eng. Hillary Onek, Minister of
Internal Affairs, 13 July 2011, copied by the author at the Lefori Sub-County Office,
Moyo District, Uganda, on 13 Oct. 2014.
149 Interview with male district councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 24 May 2017.
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elders to resolve any border disputes, reprising the long history
of local government responsibility for the international
boundary.150 In 2015, a South Sudanese minister explained
this in terms of the more pressing problems of armed rebellion
and economic crisis faced by the central government: ‘We have
boundary issues with all our neighbours, but this is not the time
to address them — only that this administration in Moyo stirred
up the issue’.151
The colonial resort to an unmapped ethnic definition of the
Kajokeji–Moyo boundary has given particular prominence a
century later to ethnic identity and the politicization of clan
territories in the borderlands, contributing to conflict along
ethnic lines, and to the attempted conflation of national
citizenship and territorial sovereignty with ethnic and clan
identities. Nearby stretches of the boundary were not defined
in such ethnic terms, where other factors such as control of the
navigable Nile outweighed the colonial preference for tribal
boundaries: like several other ethnicities, the Ma’di east of the
Nile were thus divided between Sudan and Uganda. Yet here
too, tensions have arisen in recent years as new settlement
patterns and lucrative cross-border markets have politicized
clan-based land claims, leading to intra-ethnic disputes. In
one case, rival Ma’di clans have been supported by
neighbouring district administrations in Uganda, with one
clan accusing the other of being South Sudanese and hence
having no right to land in Uganda.152 Here the boundary
line was more clearly delimited, and the people on both sides
share the same ethnicity. Yet here too, local administrative,
economic and political ambitions are entangling clan
territorialities — which may actually traverse the international
boundary — in the assertion of national territorial sovereignties
and citizenship.
150 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, to Chief
Administrative Officer, Moyo, 9 Aug. 2011, ‘Land Matter in Ijupi-Moyo Sub-
County’ and ‘Resolutions of a Joint Meeting between the Republic of South Sudan
and Uganda, 21–23 July 2011, Kajokeji County’, both in Moyo District Records
Office, CR 1203/1: Disputes.
151 Interview with government minister from Kajokeji in Juba, 22 July 2015.
152 Julian Hopwood,Elephants Abroad and in the Room: Explicit and Implicit Security,
Justice and Protection Issues on the Uganda/S. Sudan Border (London, 2015).
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VCONCLUSION
International boundaries need to be understood not just as the
result of cartographic impositions by and between states, or in
terms of centre–periphery relations, or even as products of
specific cross-border dynamics, relations and resources, but
also as part of the internal territorialization processes across
states on either side. These internal processes in Uganda and
South Sudan reveal that state territory and sovereignty is co-
produced through local-level as well as national political work,
by local actors and institutions investing in defining and
defending their ‘patch’ of jurisdiction and constituency.
The stretch of boundary on which this article has focused
exemplifies this argument — central governments over the past
century have had little direct interest in locating a clear boundary
within the no-man’s-land created by recurrent state policies and
conflicts. Instead it has been left to local institutions and actors to
assert the boundaries of state sovereignty via their own
jurisdictions. There are obviously stark contrasts with more
heavily policed and taxed boundaries around the world, where
international borders may be clearly demarcated and where
central state institutions may exert more direct control. But
even in such contexts, the meaning of external state borders is
at least partially produced by the territorial organization within
states as well as between them. This is apparent, for example, in
Anssi Paasi’s case study of a Finnish locality on the Russian
border, which, as the East–West frontier, was formally closed
and securitized during the Cold War. Yet here too, the local
history and meaning of the border for its inhabitants was
‘inseparable’ from the production and institutionalization of
other scales of territory, from the village or commune to
the province, region and state.153 Even in the context of
France — often seen to have initiated and epitomized the
formation of the unitary, centralized, territorial nation state —
state decentralization and heritage policies in recent decades have
153 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies
of the Finnish–Russian Boundary (New York, 1996), 308; see also Nadasdy,
‘Boundaries among Kin’.
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invigorated and articulated ‘multiple local territories’ with the
‘territoire/s of the nation’.154
But while state formation everywhere may involve the
construction of local and regional as well as national territory,
these processes have been particularly intense, entangled and
mutually reinforcing in the context examined in this article.
From colonial indirect rule to ongoing programmes of
decentralization, state sovereignty in South Sudan and Uganda
has been produced through the interests of local as well as
national elites in the control of territory. The resulting
patchwork territoriality of these states exhibits horizontal
tensions that to some extent work against centre–periphery
tensions, helping to hold the fabric of the state together even as
they might seem to pull it apart. As Boone writes, local
government institution-building across Africa has ‘tied distinct
rural peripheries . . . into the national space’, through ‘patterns of
segmented authority whereby regions . . . were tied to the center,
but at the same time separated from each other by the very
institutions of the state (as under colonial rule)’.155
Rather than seeing such horizontal tensions as the
fragmentation and failure of states then, we should see them as
the product of state strategies (at multiple scales) for exercising
control over people and territoryover the past century. And rather
than seeing in the segmentation of local government units a
reversion to ethnic solidarities, we might better explore this as a
process of ‘spatial socialization’ over that period,156 in which
discourses of tradition, indigeneity and historical memory are
employed in the construction of new forms of territorial
identification with administrative boundaries.157 But this shift
to an increasingly ‘territorial definition of society’ has been an
incomplete and ultimately ‘ambiguous’ process, as Gray argues
for the case of colonial Gabon.158 The boundaries themselves
154 Alexandra Kowalski, ‘The Nation, Rescaled: Theorizing the Decentralization of
Memory in Contemporary France’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, liv
(2012), 327.
155 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 344–5.
156 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness.
157 For exemplary processes of territorial ethnogenesis that did not threaten the
state’s territorial integrity, see Julie MacArthur, Cartography and the Political
Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial Kenya (Athens, Ohio, 2016); Gabrielle
Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and theKalenjin inKenya (Chicago, 2011), esp. 222.
158 Gray,ColonialRuleandCrisis inEquatorialAfrica; alsoZeller, ‘Get ItWhileYouCan’.
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have never been stable, for as Paasi reminds us, ‘territorial units
and regions, states and nations — and their representations — are
in a continual state of flux, rising and disappearing in perpetual
regional transformations’.159 The persistence of the idea that
people can carry boundaries with them — as well as the
ongoing fragmentation of administrative territories —
demonstrate the continuing instability of boundaries and
identifications in the South Sudan–Uganda borderlands. The
structures of political control can also prove to be ‘subversive of
the territorial integration they were intended to promote’, leading
to fractures, secessions or coups.160 The story told in this article is
not then a straightforward account of the role of borderlanders in
constructing state territory, any more than it is a story of state
fragmentation and failure. Rather, it is an illustration of the much
more ambiguous, unpredictable and fluctuating processes
whereby state territoriality has been localized and local
territorialities have been worked and reworked in messy and
tangled ways into the fabric of states.
Durham University Cherry Leonardi
159 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness, 302. Similarly Pittaway,
‘National Socialism and the Production of German–Hungarian Borderland Space
on the Eve of the Second World War’, esp. 178; Vandergeest and Peluso,
‘Territorialization and State Power in Thailand’.
160 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 345; see also Lotje de Vries,
Pierre Englebert and Mareike Schomerus (eds.), Secessionism in African Politics:
Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment (London, 2019). By 2016
Kajokeji would be heavily affected by South Sudan’s civil war and most of its
population fled once again to Uganda: see Nicki Kindersley and Øystein H.
Rolandsen, ‘Civil War on a Shoestring: Rebellion in South Sudan’s Equatoria
Region’, Civil Wars, xix (2017).
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